Risk awareness and risk acceptance at the Westray Coal mine:

6 General interpretation

a. The expected benefits of comparatively risky behaviour alternatives
b. The expected costs of comparatively risky behaviour alternatives
c. The expected benefits of comparatively safe behaviour alternatives
d. The expected costs of comparatively safe behaviour alternatives

The higher the values in categories a and d, the higher the target level of risk. The target level of risk will be lower as the values in categories b and c rise. The term "expected benefit" (or "expected cost") refers essentially to two underlying elements: the perceived likelihood that a benefit will in fact follow from a given behaviour alternative, and the size of that benefit. The expected benefit will be greater to the extent that the perceived likelihood of its occurrence is higher and to the extent that the size of the benefit is greater. Mathematically expressed, expected benefit = likelihood x size.
Rational decions makers, i.e., rational risk takers, will accept such a level of risk that they expect that the overall (=net) benefit of their actions will be maximal. So, the rational risk taker does not attempt to minimize risk, let alone maximize it, but instead chooses a behaviour that is associated with a level of risk at which the individual expects that his or her goals will be best satisfied. This level of risk may be called "the target level of risk", because the satisfaction of one's goals would be expected to suffer at levels of risk taking that are either lower or higher than this target level.
The term "target" is meant to be synonymous with "preferred, desired, accepted, tolerated and subjectively optimal." The target level of risk differs between conditions dependent on the behaviour alternatives that are available to the individual in that situation, as well as upon the perceived or anticipated benefits and costs of these alternatives in that situation. The target level of risk is also different for different people because people differ in their perceptions of the benefits and costs of risky and prudent behaviour options. So, the target risk varies, just as the target (=set-point, desired) temperature on a thermostat may be altered depending on the costs and benefits associated with a given temperature.
The target level of risk should not be viewed as something that people arrive at by explicitly calculating probabilities of various possible outcomes and their respective positive or negative values. A person who lowers the thermostat before going to sleep, or when leaving home for the weekend, chooses a setting intuitively rather than on the basis of precise calculations of expected cost and benefits. This is equally true when that person resets the target temperature on the thermostat the next morning or after returning from the weekend trip.
It should also be noted that the expression "target level of risk" does not imply that people strive for a certain level of risk for its own sake. Target risk does not mean risk for the sake of risk, just as the target temperature people set on their thermostat is not necessarily the one they would choose if energy costs were less important.

As will be seen in the next sections, the hearings offer evidence of the operation of all four utility factors which were mentioned above and that determine the extent of the accident risk that different people are willing to accept under a given condition, and that the same people are willing to accept under different conditions.

6.1The hearing transcripts contain many indications that the expected advantages of comparatively risky behaviour (factor a above), such as remaining in the employ of Westray Coal, were viewed as high. In an area of the province with a history of a high unemployment rate, having as job is very attractive, even if that job is a dangerous one. The underground workforce made appealing wages which must have helped - or could reasonably have been expected - to raise their socio-economic status in the community which generally holds the miners' job in relatively low esteem¹⁴. Some miners were hopeful that in the long run conditions would improve in the mine, and that promotion and long-term, stable employment might be possible, if they were willing to put up with current conditions in the short run.
Moreover, the introduction and implementation of the production bonus system held the promise of earning a level of income well above basic pay rate. As of March 1, 1992, a bonus system was instituted. Any underground employee responsible production in excess of 500 tonnes per mine-wide machine shift per month could earn a bonus. It was explained to them, by way of an example, that a person being paid at the "Miner 1" rate of $18.64/hour could make a bonus of $536.40 per month if the average machine shift production equalled 649 tonnes and the miner worked a total of 16 shifts¹⁵. Basic wage for that period would amount to 16 (shifts) times 12 (hours per shift) times $18.64 (hourly wage), that is $ 3578.88. A bonus of $536.40 would thus amount to an income increase of approximately 15%. In fact, the employees were informed that the bonus could amount to as much as 80.3% of wages depending on the level of productivity¹⁶.
The actual financial significance of the bonus payments for the miners becomes salient if one considers that as many as 14 of the 39 miners, who worked a minimum of 16 shifts in March 1992 and who were entitled to 100% of the bonus, received a productivity bonus in excess of $1000.00 over that month. For the same period of one month, the avarage bonus for employees who worked at least one shift and were no more than three days absent (i.e., 119 of 140 underground employees) amounted to $657.09¹⁷.

The question of the relationship between pay for productivity on the one hand and accident likelihood on the other has a long history in the industrial safety literature. While it is generally assumed that the gradual abolition of piece rates in favour of payment per hour has greatly contributed to the reduction of the occupational accident rate in the course of this century, the case of mining has occupied a special place. As long ago as 1969 a seminal publication on risk acceptance in return for social benefits in modern society has called attention to the relationship between pay and accident risk in mining. "Information on acceptance of "voluntary" risk by individuals as a function of income benefits is not clearly available, although we know that such a relationship must exist. Of particular interest, therefore, is the special case of miners exposed to high occupational risks. [.....] The acceptance of individual risk is an exponential function of the wage, and can be roughly approximated by a third power relationship in this range¹⁸." What the author was saying is that a pay increase by a factor 2, is associated with accident risk increases by a factor 2 to the power of 3, that is 8. In popular terms, this might read as: double the pay for production and people will take 8 times as much risk, or triple the pay and people will take 27 times as much risk. The power function between wages and accidents may also be responsible for the fact that rewarding workers for safe behaviour by means of relatively small incentives for accident-free operation often leads to relatively large reductions in the accident rate¹⁹.
Although it may be difficult to determine whether these relationships also hold for Canadian coal mining in the late 20th century, they do contain ample warning of the pernicious effect of production bonuses on employee safety. We should not be surprised by the fact that many of the Westray miners responded to the production bonus system as they did, that is, by trying to increase their production while sacrificing safety by rushing, taking shortcuts and working long hours without appropriate rest pauses.

There was one particular aspect to the bonus system that make this response especially likely and rational. When the relationship between the size of the bonus and rate of overproduction (meaning production in access of 500 tonnes) is considered in detail, we can see that we are dealing here with a positively accelerated function. This means that the size of the bonus increased faster that the rate of overproduction, or that equal increments in overproduction led to increasingly greater bonuses. For instance, an increase in production from 500 to 549 tonnes produced a wage increase of 3.8%, while a an increase of production from 600 to 649 tonnes (i.e., the same absolute increase) yielded a wage increase of 6.1% (i.e., 15.0% minus 8.9%)²⁰.
At the same time, there was a major economic penalty for missing a shift. One day lost reduced the bonus by 25%; two, three and four days reduced the bonus by 50%, 75% and 100% respectively. Clearly, there was thus great pressure not to miss any shifts due to sickness, injuries or weather conditions²¹.

Many miners appear to have been fully cognizant of the added danger posed by the production incentives²². They also reported that they became habituated to the dangerous conditions, that their safety consciousness eroded with the passage of time and that they grew more and more complacent. Their complacent attitude allowed an increase in their risk-taking behaviour, such as deliberately, though reluctantly, setting the methanometer higher than the required setting²⁴ and hiding jerry cans that shouldn't be there from the inpector's eyes²⁵.

Others reported, as stated above, that they were inclined to accept the hazardous working conditions in hopes that, if they tolerated them in the short run, they would ultimately be rewarded in the long run with better working conditions²⁶, promotion and job security for a good number of years²⁷.

6.2It is true that the expected costs of comparatively risky behaviour alternatives (factor b in Section 6 above), and thus the perceived dangers of staying in the employ of the mine were also high. Most miners were acutely aware of the dangers posed by the methane, coal dust, poor ventilation, unstable roofs, and the lack of appropriate safety training²⁸. They were also aware of the danger-enhancing effect of the production bonus system because they realized the way it influenced their own behaviour: heightening the tempo of production by increasing the rush, cutting corners and inceasing carelessness²⁹.

6.3The expected benefits of comparatively safe behaviour alternatives (factor c above) were low. There was some indication of potential risk-reducing behaviours. These included complaining to the mine's management or to the mining inspector about the dangerous working conditions, and/or quitting their jobs and looking for another place of employment. In the opinion of the miners, the expected safety gain of all these options for action, with the exception of quitting, was very small.

They felt that complaining to the Westray Coal management about the hazardous working conditions was unlikely to have the desired effect on safety³⁰. Conversely, it was seen as a sure way of getting fired or losing the privilege of working overtime³¹. They felt intimidated³², and they feared not having the necessary proof or data to substantiate their concerns about safety³³. The possibility of complaining to the provincial mining inspector about the hazardous conditions prevailing in the mine was also viewed as hampered by management³⁴ and useless^35. Some miners even expressed the feeling that the mine management was being supported by the mine inspector and that productivity was given priority over safety³⁶. The mine inspector was reported to have said - when asked if he could put a stop to the bonus system - that "his hands were tied and there was a lot of pressure to make this mine a success³⁷."
Employment at a different and better mine might might be refused because of an understanding or agreement between other mines and Westray Coal³⁸.

6.4The expected costs of relatively safe behaviour alternatives factor d above) were high. Among these alternatives was the possibility of complaining to the mine's management about the work hazards, looking for another job, going on unemployment insurance. Some miners expressed the feeling that going to the mine inspector could also lead to the loss of one's job, because the mine inspector might communicate the name of the complainant to the mine's management³⁹.
Apparently, there was a case in which a miner did indeed complain to the inspector with the result that the miner was fired⁴⁰.
Fear of retaliation for complaining in attempt to reduce accident risk appears to have been a major factor in discouraging miners from this course of action. They felt that, while their complaint would be ignored, they themselves would be fired and readily replaced by another person who was looking for work in the area that was marked by a large proportion of unemployed⁴¹. It is also for this reason, i.e., fear of losing his job, that one miner decided to refrain from going to the mass media and bring the dangerous conditions out into the open⁴².
Moreover, there was concern about being turned down for Unemployment Insurance UI) benefits, either having left Westray voluntarily, which might be views as frivolous and unwarranted⁴³, or, of having accumulated an insufficient duration of employment to qualify for UI benefits⁴⁴.
Finally, some miners mentioned reasons for not quitting the mine that transcended the predominant economic motives and practicalities that we have seen so far. These miners felt that discontinuing their presence in the mine would constitute a breach of the moral obligation to solidarity with one's endangered colleagues⁴⁵ or to devotion to the mine which deserved to be looked after, no matter the discord between workers and management⁴⁶.

7 Recapitulation

8 Implications

Against this background it is easy to see why incentive programmes are able to ring about major improvements in safety records, just as production bonuses may enhance productivity. The latter, however, are likely to have a detrimental effect upon safety as we have seen above (especially when they take the form as they did in the Westray case), while no productivity loss has ever been reported in association with the operation of a safety incentive scheme. On the contrary, safety incentive schemes have been shown to have remarkably high benefit/cost ratios.

For the purpose of future accident prevention, it would, therefore, seem entirely appropriate to consider more extensive implementation of safety incentive systems in mining operations and to seriously question the appropriateness of production bonus schemes in such operations that have comparatively high accident involvement rates.⁵⁶

The notes below refer - unless indicated otherwise - to identified pages in the hearing transcripts or the exhibits. (Names mentioned refer to Mr. Gerald Phillips, mine manager, and Mr. Roger Parry, underground manager).

² Exhibits 120.034 (Inter-Office Memorandum, announcing the production bonus scheme), 120.040 (Inter-Office Memorandum, regarding incentive system implementation), 120.044 (Underground Bonus Plan, March 1992) and 120.049 (Inter-office Memorandum, regarding incentive bonus for April 1992).

³ See, for instance, Smith, C.P. (Ed.) (1992). Motivation and personality: Handbook of thematic content analysis. New York: Cambridge University Press.

⁴ "You wonder how long you lived as long as you did, as simple as that. Like, we all knew amongst ourselves, we all knew stuff was going to happen but we never thought we were going to lose the whole mine and 26 guys." [p. 32/3 of office\wpwin\dol\intervws\CHAPMAN.DOL]. "We all risked our lives." Questions:" rather than speak up?" Answer: "That's right. It's 'just the way it was there." [p. 7737/9 of MAR19-FA].

⁵ See, for instance, Mechanic, D. Some modes of adaptation: defense. In Monat, A. and Lazarus, R.S. (Eds.) (1991). Stress and coping: An anthology. New York: Columbia University Press.

⁶ I found two instances of the attempts to "laugh things off". The first is on p. 14/15 of office\wpwin\transcpt\intervws\TAJE. "We used to laugh about it, how we all had kinks in our neck from looking up [looking up continuously at the unstable roofs]." Again with reference to the roof, the expression emerged: "That is local stuff" (see p. 1888/9 of MAR20DD). " [....] the roof would be working -- Like, you'd have a stranger, a new fellow, in the mine. That's just local stuff. They called it "local" [...] I don't know, it picked up somewhere. It started somewhere and just continued on through the whole mine. [....] A new fellow could see a small amount of rock that was moving, but none of the men that were there for a longer period of time expected or thought that anything more was going to develop [...]. But a new fellow could see that as "Geez, I'm going to get buried." But the more experienced fellow that was there longer would say, No, you know, "That's local stuff", that there was an outlet that way." (op. cit.).

⁷ "Well, if we had a fire boss coming down on your back all the time bothering you, you would probably get excited [.....] Well, he used to come in and rush us all the time [...] And they would be rushing more and taking their frustrations out on the bolts instead of on the fire boss [p. 7015/7 of FEB14-TM].

⁸ Question: "But you personally didn't fear for your own safety?" Answer: "Oh, no, because I had years of experience behind me. Like, so I was more apt to recognize a, you know, something that was going wrong than a greenhorn." [p. 9400/1 of APR01-BC]. "And once the mine got along a little ways, we would be able to get a union in there, and we'd be able to have a little bit of say and maybe change things around a little bit, you know" [p. 4161/3 of JAN18-MF]

⁹ Freud, A. (1946). The ego and the mechanisms of defense. London: Hogarth Press.

¹⁰ See Wright, G. (1984). Behavioural Decision Theory. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin.

¹¹ See Weinstein, N.D. Unrealistic optimism about future life events. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39, 806-912.

¹² Taylor, S.E. and Brown, J.D. (1988). Illusion and well-being: A social psychological perspective on mental health. Psychological Bulletin, 103, 193-210.

¹³ See p. 18/19 of office\wpwin\transcpt\intervws\MACDONNL. An employee testified having received payment from the mine's administration in return for not reporting a lost-time accident to Workers' Compensation.

¹⁴ Social status, or socio-economic status of an occupation is commonly expressed in Canada by means of the so-called Blishen scale. This scale ranks occupations according to a combined function of income and education levels (as assessed by tax records and census and analysed by StatsCan) of the individuals who have these occupations. The scale is periodically updated as more recent census data become available. The most recent relevant publication is: Blishen, B.R., Carroll, W.K. and Moore, C. (1987). The 1981 socioeconomic index for occupations in Canada. Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, 24, 465-488.
The inquiry proceedings also makes reference to the low social status position of miners in the community: " In our community [...] you were down there. You were a dirty dog when you were a coal miner [...]. Scott Paper come in and Michelin come in. Better paying industries, supposedly better working conditions, better working environment. When you were a miner, you were on the other end of the scale, at the end of it." [p. 7769/70 of MAR20-DD]

¹⁵ Exhibit 120.034

¹⁶ Exhibit 120.034

¹⁷ Calculated from Exhibit 120.044.

¹⁸ Starr, C. (1969). Social Benefit versus Technological Risk. Science, 165, 1232-1238.

¹⁹ This is a general finding with respect to the use of safety-incentive programmes as a means to prevent accidents in occupational settings (McAfee, R.B. and Winn, A.R. (1989). The use of incentives/feedback to enhance work place safety. Journal of Safety Research, 20, 7-19; Peters, R.H. (1991). Strategies for encouraging self-protective employee behavior. Journal of Safety Research, 22, 53-70; Wilde, G.J.S., 1994. Target Risk: Dealing with the Danger of Death, Disease and Damage in Everyday Decisions. Toronto: PDE Publications; Wilde, G.J.S. Accident models: Risk homeostasis. Chapter 56.11 in Jeanne. M. Stellman (Editor-in-Chief), ILO Encyclopaedia of Occupational Health and Safety (4th edition). Geneva, CH: International Labour Office, 1998. Wilde, G.J.S. Safety Incentive Programmes. Chapter 60.16 in Jeanne. M. Stellman (Editor-in-Chief), ILO Encyclopaedia of Occupational Health and Safety (4th edition). Geneva, CH: International Labour Office, 1998. Wilde, G.J.S. Improving Trucking Safety and Profitability through Safety Incentive Schemes. In F.F. Saccomanno and J.H. Shortreed (Eds.), Truck Safety: Perceptions and Reality. Waterloo, Ontario, Canada: The Institute for Risk Research, 1996 (ISBN 0-9696747-7-5). Wilde, G.J.S. The concept of target risk and its implications for accident prevention strategies. In A.M. Feyer and A. Williamson (Eds.), Occupational Injury: Risk, Prevention and Intervention. London: Taylor and Francis (to appear in 1997).

With respect to mining, a remarkably strong accident-prevention effect was observed after implementation of safety-incentive programmes at two mines in the US (Fox, D.K., Hopkins, B.L. and Anger, W.K. 1987. The long-term effects of a token economy on safety performance in open-pit mining. Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 20, 215-224). Workers in a uranium mine in Wyoming and a coal mine in Arizona were given saving stamps for each month of accident-free operation. Stamps were earned both on the basis of individual performance as well collective performance of work team. They could be saved up and exchanged for merchandise. From data presented in the article it can be deduced that the total value of the stamps given to workers at the uranium mine in 1972 amounted to US$13,850 in constant-value dollars (reference 1970). At that time, the number of workers equalled about 288. So, the average annual value (=cost to the company) of the stamps was about US$83 (in constant-value dollars) per worker (accident-involved and accident-free combined). Similar calculations lead to estimation of the average annual value of the safety bonus at the coal mine at approximately US$47 per employee.

These safety bonuses would appear quite modest in comparison to the production bonuses at Westray Coal. Yet, the savings due to accident reduction were quite substantial. The authors of the American report mentioned that the costs of accidents and injuries declined at the uranium mine from a baseline average of US$294,00 per year to an average during the incentive programme of USS$29,000 per year. The decline in the coal mine was from US$367,696 per year prior to the incentive programme to US$38,972 per year in constant-value dollars. Both declines approximated 90%. "The benefit/cost ratios, or ratios of dollars saved by the reduction of accidents and injuries to dollars spent on the [incentive programme, adjusted for hours worked and inflation] ranged from 18.1 to 27.8 at the [uranium] mine and from 12.9 to 20.7 at the [coal] mine." (op. cit., p. 220-221). Other studies, not detailed here, also demonstrate that comparatively modest rewards for safety can bring about comparatively large increases in safety, just as comparatively small increases in the reward for productivity can lead to comparatively large increases in the accident rate. References can be found in the publications cited at the start of this footnote.

²⁰ The relationship between the amount of production over 500 tones and the size of the bonus per tonne expressed in dollar cents has been graphed in Figure 1. In Figure 2, the effect of the productivity bonus system on the monthly earnings of an employee working at a Miner 1 hourly rate has been expresed in graph form. Figure 3 is based on exactly the same data, but the relationship has been graphed as a curve as this makes the positively accelerated function more obvious, and a mathematical equation that gives a good fit has been added.

²¹One miner reported to have been encouraged by the mine's management to move from Cape Breton to the Westray area, because it would reduce the chances of missing any shifts due to being snowed in and increase the opportunity for more overtime. [page 5543-5545 of FEB06-JL].

²² This may be illustrated by means of the following citations from the Inquiry hearings:
a. "Question: Is it a good idea to have a bonus system in a coal mine?" Answer: "No [....], because it pushes men to a point where they'll do anything to make an extra dollar." [p. 6401/2 of FEB12-BR].
b. "I wasn't too keen on that either because I figured the boys are going to start taking shortcuts" [p. 28/29 of office\wpwin\dol\intervws\MACKAY.DO].
c. "[....] Those fellows would still be alive today. Because everybody was intimidated. Everybody was and they played one guy against the other, one group against the other. The miners against the shuttle car drivers; the bolters against the miners; the tradesmen against the miners; these guys are holding you up, they're costing you money, you are not going to get a bonus because of this, you're not going to get a bonus because of that. If this arsehole hadn't done that, you'd got this completed, you would have had an extra four or five hours bonus money or whatever." [p. 27 of office\wpwin\dol\intervws\MACIN-CJ.DOL (21-Aug-92)].
d. After reporting on the extra tonnage harvested under the bonus system, one miner added:"We also got 10 cables too though. Destroyed 10 cables, hitting them with the cars, the shuttle cars, miner [=mining machine] running them over." [p.13/14 of office\wpwin\dol\intervws\ JOHNSTON.DOL (08-Jul-92)]. This would presumably increase the risk of fire/explosions.
e."Some other times the shuttle car would across cables on the ground and cut them or pinch them by the wall which would create a ball of fire." [office\wpwin\rcmp\statemnt\NOTES.GIN (12-May-92)].

²³ See, for instance, p. 8589/90 of MAR26-JD; p. 8691/93 of MAR26-JD; p. 8444/5 of MAR25-JD; p. 7965/6 of MAR20-DD; p. 7015/7 of FEB14-TM; p. 6685/7 of FEB13-RM.

²⁴ See p. 4462/3 of JAN23-HM

²⁵ Question; "[...] Because not only did you know there were jerry cans there that shouldn't be there, but you now knew that you were hiding the jerry cans from an inspector which seems to make to make it twice as bad. Why did you do that?" Answer: "I can't honestly answer you [...] I was ordered to do it and I did it." [p. 8444/5 of MAR25-JD].

²⁶ See for instance p. 40/1 of office\wpwin\trancpt\intervews\REGLPALM. "And once the mine got along a little ways, we would be able to get a union in there, and we'd be able to have a little bit of say and maybe change things around a little bit, you know" [p. 4161/3 of JAN18-MF]

²⁷ "If I proved a good worker -- if they decided to hire me, that I could look forward to 15 years' work. And if things went allright with this seam, they might possibly go into the Cage seem and that might add another 10 years' work. So things looked pretty [...] good for my future if I did indeed get hired [p. 5088/9 of JAN25CYR]. "Work for a lifetime" [p. 6798/9 of FEB13-RM]. "He [i.e., Mr. Parry] said this mine is going to last 15 years. And they had another -- Allan seam, I believe, and if they could get into that, it would be a 30-year project." [p. 5463/4 of FEB06-JL].

²⁸"The men had absolutely no training." [p.6426/7 of FEB12-BR].
"And the electrician wasn't experienced in a coal mine before either."[p.37/8 from office\wpwin\transcpt\intervws\REGLPALM].
Also see p. 6694/5 of FEB13-RM.

²⁹ "[...] corners were taken to make it easier and people started to slough off and the cogging procedures weren't going according to the book, we'll say. They weren't being done right. They were just kind of being slapped together for the sake of getting the job out of the bloody way" [p. 61/2 of office\wpwin\transcpt\intervws\TAJE].

³⁰ The miners often mentioned being intimidated [p. 68/9 of office\wpwin\transcpt\ intervws\ ROBINSON] by management or told "to quit being a shit disturber" [p. 4 of office\wpwin\rcmp\ statemnt\EVANS.STA]. "They'd pound you into submission pretty well, you know, like verbally." [p.4161/3 of JAN18-MF]. "Yes, he said that he could put in a good word for me and that if I went over and apologized and geared up and went back underground and kept my mouth shut, that I'd -- I had that option or walking the streets." [p. 6233/4 of FEB08-CG].

³¹ "They got back at you, you know, if you complained too much or asked too many questions or ever - whatever I did, they got back to me by banning me from overtime [p. 107/8 of office\wpwin\transcpt\intervws\BARDAUSK]. Question: "So, you were prepared to work in what you thought were unsafe conditions instead of going to the inspector notwithstanding that?" Answer:"Well, there was no other place to acquire a job at the time." [p. 5525/6 of FEB-JL].

³² At the time -- I remember very clearly Roy saying; "I'm not going in there. You're fucking going to kill somebody there and you don't care." And Roger's answer to that was: "Roy, either you go in there and bolt that fucking heading or you can go fucking take you lunch can and go up the drift; you're fired." [p. 3991/2 of JA18-WC].
"Shortly after he went on his own, there was an incident where the burning torches were brought underground during his shift. He left the mine. He wouldn't stay underground while there was a burning process going on underground. When he went to surface -- and I'm not sure of the time frame except that I talked to Steve about it afterwards, and he told me that he was suspended for leaving the mine and told not to do that again, to think about his job. And if he was going to do that sort of thing again that he would be suspended or fired.' [p. 3996/7 of JAN18-WC].
Question: "And what happened to Mr. Pasemko as a result of the complaints he made?" Answer: "Roger told him one day: "If you don't like it here, pick up you lunch can and go back to Alberta" [p. 6660/1 of FEB13-DM].
"I don't care what anybody says, when a man's pushed he's going to do stuff. I don't care, even it's you or naybody. You fellows will say now, oh no, I wouldn't work in there. But if you was in our situation, you would do it. And I don't care what they say. Or anybody says. When you've got a job and you've got a family to feed, you keep your mouth shut." [p. 25/6 of office\wpwin\dol\ intervews\MALONE.DOL].
"I don't really know that they ever fired anaybody, but intimidation was always there because this mine was -- and they knew this when they started the mine down here, that it was in an area where they had a high instance of unemployment--." [p. 68/9 of office\wpwin\transcpt\ intervws\ROBINSON].
"It was intimidation, intimidation from day one." [p. 108/9 of office\wpwin\transcpt\intervws \BARDAUSK]. See, for instance p. 37/8 of office\wpwin\trancpt\intervws\WRICE].
"I come in that morning and there had been a roof fall, and the crew had attempted to start to arch it. And it started to come in again, and they had run out of the way. But the boom truck had got caught under the fall. And I had only been working there maybe two or three months at the time, and I was a little nervous. So I jokingly asked M. Phillips if there was any danger pay, hoping that he would tell me to stay on surface. And he said there was no danger there. And I said: "You wouldn't lie to a fellow?" And he said: "If you're scared, go the f'ing home." [p. 5974/5 of FEB07-AC];
"The mannerism of the place was "do your job. Don't complain, and get it done as fast as possible." [p. 5257/8 og FEB05-JK].
Also see p.4020/1 of JAN-WC.

³³ "He told me that according to the Coal Mines Regulation Act, which I had never read to this point, that there was no methanometer required on the miner, so I didn't have a leg to stand on and that I would go and get myself fired for nothing, right?" [p. 4018/9 of JAN18-WC].

³⁴ "yes, when he [i.e. the mine inspector] was in the mine, he was very closely accompanied by the mine management. You couldn't separate him from mine management in order to bring a concern to his attention. I you did say anything, mine management would be right there to hear everything." [p. 5525/6 of FEB06-JL].

³⁵ See p.4161/3 of JAN18-MF.

³⁶ "We complained to them, it didn't do us any good and I guess we felt that the government was probably with them as well. And if the inspectors weren't going do to anything about it, I mean, we felt that was our backup" [p. 28/9 of office\wpwin\dol\intervws\MACIN-CJ.DOL]; "Well, the Inspection Department didn't seem too interested [...]" [p. 4161/3 of JAN18-MF].

³⁷ See p.2. of office\wpwin\rcmp\statemnt\EVANS.STA.

³⁸ "[...] They did not want to take men from there to -- because it would look bad on them, reflect bad on them." [p. 5525/6 of FEB06-JL]. Also see p. 5584/5 of FEB06-JL.

³⁹ "I don't think it would have made any difference, because I would have been out the door and it would have been covered up and I would not have been there" [p. p.7701/2 of MAR19-FA].
"If I had submitted something to one of the inspectors, I honestly believe in my - - this is my own way of thinking, that if I complained to Albert or any other mines inspector, that it would have got back to Roger. I know the point would have been made to Roger [...], but my name would have been brought up. And I know very well that I would have been gone" [p. 8011/2 of MAR21-FA].
"There was a complaint made to the Department of Labour, and Roger Parry came in to the deployment this -- you know, in one of his crazy moods, just hollering and screaming and belittling everybody on the crew. He brought all -- he brought the crews together, the two crews, like, the one that was coming up and the one that was coming down. And I mean, he said to every man there, like the supervisors were there, all the working men were there, and he was there. "One of you blankety-blankers went to the Department of Labour, and if I ever find out who, I will fire you." And I mean, like he's screaming; the slobber is coming out of him. Like, he's just irate. Like, he's not sitting here like I am just saying this to you people. He is going crazy; he's ranting, he's raving, he's kicking the garbage can, he's kicking the door, he's kicking the wall. Like, he's going -- he's going crazy. "And if I ever find out who, you will be fired." [p. 7993/4 of MAR20-DD].
"Question: "Well, what would Roger's presence have to do with you raising a concern, as a mine examiner, with the mines inspector?" Answer: "Well, like I said, I don't think I would have been there too long if had made too many waves." [p. 7683/4 of MAR19-FA].

⁴⁰ See p. 6238/9 of FEB08-CG.

⁴¹ "There was no point in complaining to the company. After trying several times, and being told that either you work there or someone else would, you tend to keep quiet. The turn-over at the mine is a reflection of this attitude. Men have gone there and worked one shift, some worked a full week but few last too long." [p. 2 of office\wpwin\rcmp\statemnt\WENTZELL.UIC].
Question: "What about quitting, did you ever think about quitting?" Answer; "It wasn't really an option to me. I know I wanted to, but, like, I say, I -- there was no other work out there." [p. 7243/5 of FEB20-RF].
"There was no other place to acquire a job at the time." [p. 5525/6 of FEB06-JL]. "I just said I'm not going back. He -- I don't think they were too worried about it becasue there was lots of people coming and going. Lots of people had applications in, I mean, easy to fill one spot [...]." [p. 22/3 of office\wpwin\transcpt\intervws\POIRIER].

⁴² See p. 7737/9 of MAR19-FA.

⁴³ "I said I left for unsafe conditions. And I had -- January 2, I went before what they call a board of referees, which is an independent board. And I explained to them about the unsafe conditions, mostly about the ground conditions. And they interviewed somebody from the company as well, and I guess between the company and myself they said that they more or less believed the company [.....] I said I don't really think it's fair. I said, I got a nine-week penalty, you know [....]' [p. 37/8 of office\wpwin\transcpt\intervws\WRICE].
"And don't forget this, there were men quitting that rat hole, they'd go to UI and say "I quit because of coal dust, bad ground conditions, and methane," and UI used to phone the mine and say "What's the situation? No problem". The guy gets denied UI which is -- I think there's some -- I think that should be checked out. So, a person can't quit because -- you walk away, you get nothing, and you also don't get UI." [p.4371/1 of JAN22-RS].
"I would contribute that fact [namely of continuing to work at Westray] to manpower telling me that I would be not getting my unemployment for a period of couple of months, and I didn't relish the fact of applying for welfare" [p. 4831/2 of JAN24-LB].
"I would have quit there, I should have quit there, but I didn't. I stayed working there because I would have been waiting 5 or 8 weeks for unemployment [...]" [p.256/6 of office\wpwin\ dol\intervws\WALSH2.DOL].

⁴⁴ See p. 68/9 of office\wpwin\transcpt\intervws\MARSHALL.

⁴⁵ "I went back because I needed the work and because my buddies were there and I felt things could be more secure if I was there with them." [office\wpwin\rcmp\statemnt\RYAN.STA].
"Well, then what do you do, and if I quit, it's not going to make any difference. I'm not going to help the guys who are still working there, if I quit, and a lot of guys did quit, but it didn't make any difference in the situation in the mine." [p. 68/9 of office\wpwin\transcpt\intervws\ ROBINSON].

⁴⁶ "I want to help the mine. Like, the mine, not Curragh [i.e., the company owning Westray Coal]. Like, the mine for the miners, is separate for the company that I worked for. You felt for the mine, Like, I wanted to help the mine as the entity itself. Like, I wanted to keep -- I wanted to see the mine keep going. Like, I wanted to help the physical structure of the mine. [.....] They [i.e., the miners] have the problem with the management, but they still need their baby when they go back." [p. 7888/9 of MAR20DD].

⁴⁷ See p. 3646/7 of JAN16-AL.

⁴⁸ See, for instance, Yates, J.F. (Ed.) (1992). Risk-taking behavior. New York: Wiley.

⁴⁹ A recent review of over 53 different evaluation studies is the one by Guastello, S.J. (1991). Do we really know how well our occupationalo accident prevention programs work? Safety Science, 16, 445-463.

⁵⁰ Cited in Wilde, G.J.S. Improving Trucking safety and Profitability through Safety Incentive Schemes. In F.F. Saccomanno and J.H. Shortreed (Eds.), Truck Safety: Perceptions and Reality. Waterloo, Ontario, Canada: The Institute for Risk Research, 1996 (ISBN 0-9696747-7-5).

⁵¹ US (Fox, D.K., Hopkins, B.L. and Anger, W.K. 1987. The long-term effects of a token economy on safety performance in open-pit mining. Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 20, 215-224.

⁵² Same as above

⁵³ Synnett, R.J. (1992). Construction safety: A turnaround program. Professional Safety, 37, 33-37.

⁵⁴ McAfee, R.B. and Winn, A.R. (1989). The use of incentives/feedback to enhance work place safety. Journal of Safety Research, 20, 7-19. Peters, R.H. (1991). Strategies for encouraging self-protective employee behavior. Journal of Safety Research, 22, 53-70

⁵⁵ See Chapter 11 in Wilde, G.J.S. (1994). Target risk: Dealing with the danger of death, disease and damage in everyday decisions. Toronto: PDE Publications.

⁵⁶ See, for instance, National Safety Council (various years). Accident Facts. Chicago.

RELEVANT LINKS:

Visitors since July 21, 1998